Speedy Trial and Covid-19

Speedy Trial Delays Due To Exceptional Circumstances in New York:

How Will the Covid-19 Effect Speedy Trial Determinations

Todd A. Spodek
3 min readMar 30, 2020

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New York Speedy Trial Law:

New York’s Speedy Trial Law is codified in CPL 30.30 and requires the District Attorney’s office to establish their readiness for trial on an “offense” within a specified time period after the commencement of a criminal action. The commencement of an action is generally once the accusatory instrument is filed.

If the District Attorney is not ready for trial within the required time period may be entitled to dismissal of the accusatory instrument under CPL 30.30(1), or release pending trial, pursuant to CPL 30.30(2). The statute excludes certain designated periods from the time calculation.

Understanding the Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violations:

The first step is to determine the highest crime charged, and then the applicable time period. Next, the defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute. Once the defendant has made that showing, the People bear the burden of demonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss.

In Determining How Covid-19 Play Will Play Out In Speedy Trial Calculations:

It helps to look back into other natural disasters and see how courts interpret speedy trial calculations. Recently, 9–11 and Hurricane Sandy were held to be exceptional circumstances.

Hurricane Sandy:

One case out of New York Criminal Court is People v. Sheehan.

After Hurricane Sandy, the court reviewed the natural and plain meaning of the words used in the law and held that the suspension of section CPL 30.30 is applicable in cases where the speedy trial limitation period “concludes” that is expires at a set date.

The Court in that case looked at the Executive Law which mandated that “suspension orders provide for the minimum deviation from the requirements of the statute … consistent with the disaster action deemed necessary”

The court held that the seven day period between October 29, 2012, when the courthouse closed due to Hurricane Sandy, and November 5, 2012, when the courthouse re-opened, constitutes an exceptional circumstance and is thus excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(g).

The court found no basis, however, to deem the week following the court’s re-opening excludable as an exceptional circumstance. The court had fully re-opened and, unlike the week before when the pending cases of non-incarcerated defendants were administratively adjourned to dates in January and February 2013, the cases of “out” defendants were heard on the actual dates to which they had been scheduled pre-Hurricane Sandy.

September 11th Attacks

One case out of New York Criminal Court is People v. Aquino

As a result of the tragedy on September 11, the courthouse was closed from September 11, 2001 until September 17, 2001. During this state of emergency, mail delivery, vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic were suspended in the area in which the courthouse and the District Attorney’s office are located. Additionally, the courthouse, the District Attorney’s office and nearby businesses were without phone service. Given these circumstances the People, if ready, would not have been able to declare their readiness for trial on the record or to communicate their readiness by filing and serving a certificate of readiness off-calendar.

Thus, the period between September 11, 2001 and September 14, 2001 is not chargeable to the People as it qualifies as an exceptional circumstance. (CPL 30.30 [4] [g].)

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Todd A. Spodek
Todd A. Spodek

Written by Todd A. Spodek

Managing partner of Spodek Law Group P.C. a boutique criminal defense and family/divorce law firm located in New York City | spodeklawgroup.com

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